Clearing up the scandal that has cast suspicion on the Hungarian secret service is entirely up to the government

According to the article, on July 8, 2025, based on an anonymous tip, the National Bureau of Investigation (NNI) conducted a search at the homes of two IT specialists on suspicion that they were involved in child pornography. The Constitution Protection Office (AH) had specifically called the NNI's attention to this tip. During the search, police discovered that the two IT specialists were linked to the Tisza Party; one of them, a 38-year-old man going by the nickname Buddha, was responsible for protecting the party’s IT infrastructure. The younger of the two, 19-year-old Gundalf had previously worked for the party but was no longer employed there at the time of the search.

No, they didn't; on the contrary, no evidence was found during the investigation to suggest that the two men were in any way involved in child pornography. However, police did find hundreds of screenshots indicating an attempt to recruit one of them on their confiscated devices. According to the findings, a person using the alias “Henry” tried to persuade the younger IT specialist to grant him access to the party’s IT system so he could then bring down the party; the IT specialist, however, informed his colleague of this and feigned cooperation with "Henry". Police also seized a belt equipped with a hidden camera, which the IT specialists had intended to use to expose the recruiter. It was because of this belt that they were ultimately charged with the unlawful use of military equipment.

The AH denied to the police that it had anything to do with Henry’s operation, but one of the investigators in the case suspected otherwise. The AH did not respond to inquiries from journalists, which is not unusual, as intelligence agencies do not typically comment publicly on individual cases.

It is possible, since Direkt36 – even though it reported specific details – cited an anonymous source. But almost immediately after the article was published, proceedings were initiated against investigator Bence Szabó for abuse of office, because he admitted to his supervisors that he was the one who had leaked the materials to the press. At the same time as Szabó was charged, Direkt36 published a video interview with him which had been recorded earlier. In this interview, the police officer stated his name and showed his face as he recounted the story from his perspective. This video was viewed by a huge number of people, and it clearly carried weight that the speaker was a police investigator who was visibly dedicated to his work. Not to mention that he had previously investigated cases in which the victims were children. This further reinforced his credibility and the sympathy people felt towards him.

There is nothing to suggest that Bence Szabó was not telling the truth about the things he saw and experienced as an investigator during the investigation. It is also clear that Direkt36 adhered to all professional standards when handling the case, including when uncovering and presenting the facts. At the same time, it is important to note that Szabó examined the case as a police officer – and he only had insight into part of it. Furthermore, it is also important to note that part of the story he presented is based on his own conclusions. But given that we are not talking about a regular police officer but an investigator, his conclusions cannot be ignored. Moreover, he claimed that he was not alone in his conclusions; his colleagues had reached similar ones as well.

It is therefore no coincidence that, while the AH’s director general, Szabolcs Bárdos did not react to the article’s publication, he did respond to the statement made by Szabó. A previously classified letter was published on the parliament’s website; it was written by the head of the secret service to the chairman of the parliament’s National Security Committee, Zoltán Sas of the Jobbik party. In it, Bárdos essentially outlined a spy story. With this, the AH implied that the secret service had carried out a counterintelligence operation, and it was in the course of this operation that the two IT specialists became targets.

It did not. In fact, the key questions remained unanswered. The letter written by the AH’s director general does not explain who the person referred to as “Henry” in the Direkt36 article might be – this was the individual who sought to recruit the IT specialists working for the Tisza Party. Furthermore, in the letter, Bárdos also made no mention of the cyberattack against the party. Nor did the AH director respond to Szabó’s claim that the secret service had exerted pressure to ensure that the police did not pursue any investigation into Henry's real identity. In short: things did not become any clearer.

No one from the intelligence services contested or acknowledged this. However, it is standard practice in intelligence operations to cover up an operation – in this case, the seizure of data storage devices – with some sort of cover story.

The two sides have completely different narratives about what happened. Péter Magyar, the leader of the Tisza Party, considers the matter more serious than the Watergate scandal in the U.S., because he believes the Hungarian secret services carried out an operation against the Tisza Party, and he considers investigator Bence Szabó a hero and a patriot.

Those on the government's side are also talking about a similarly serious matter, but from a completely different perspective. Government propaganda has been hammering the message that "more and more Ukrainian spies are being exposed in the country," and claims that the two Tisza Party IT specialists were trained abroad, with Buddha paying frequent visits to the Ukrainian embassy, which is why a counterintelligence operation was carried out against him. Viktor Orbán, meanwhile, went so far as to declare that “Zelenskyy should recall his agents at once”.

In other words, the government has reinforced the narrative that Ukrainian intelligence agencies are interfering in the Hungarian election on behalf of the Tisza Party, while those critical of the government and the opposition claim that it is likely that an intelligence operation may have been underway against the Tisza Party, which was then exposed by Bence Szabó’s testimony. It is also important to note that the government's communication has been stressing that Szabó is a police officer who knows nothing about counterintelligence, and therefore he could not have understood – or might have misunderstood – what was going on around him.

Based on the information that has been made public so far, there is nothing to support this claim.

This was the suspicion of the Tisza Party’s IT specialists, and investigator Bence Szabó also spoke of suspecting this, but there is no evidence to support this either. According to reputable experts, including Péter Buda, who previously served as a senior national security officer at the AH, if the allegations are true, the government should resign immediately. However, a fact-finding investigation would be necessary to determine what actually happened. As of now, however, there is no word that such an investigation is being planned.

It seems that, from a political point of view, this is currently not in the interest of either side. Although there is a forum where this would theoretically be possible, the Parliament’s National Security Committee resembles a social club, more than a body that can be taken seriously. Moreover, there are less than two weeks left until the elections. For the government, it is currently more advantageous to continue constructing its own false narrative – namely, that Ukrainians are behind the Tisza Party – than to clarify the situation. And based on statements from the Tisza Party, it appears that Péter Magyar and his colleagues no longer have any confidence that the truth will come to light during the Orbán government’s tenure. For this reason, the Tisza Party has promised an investigation after the change of government; at which time they intend to present what they know about this matter to an independent judiciary.

Mostly by not disclosing all the information. Instead, they are only releasing details from this otherwise classified case to the public which they hope will reinforce their narrative. Among experts, however, this has the counterproductive effect of reinforcing the suspicion that the allegations are true. Which would also explain why, on Saturday, in an attempt to support its own narrative, the government posted a video on its Facebook page that was recorded during an interrogation at the AH. In the edited footage, two AH officers are questioning one of the IT specialists involved in the case, 19-year-old Gundalf. The video was recorded after the raid. Commenting on the footage, the government and Viktor Orbán said that the IT specialist “admitted” that he had been recruited by the Ukrainians.

The IT specialist makes no such statement in the published video recording. This means the government made an unsubstantiated claim, which does not correspond to reality. Such governmental communication is counterproductive, because it gives the impression that the government is not being transparent in this matter. Incidentally, in the recording, the IT specialist does mention that he had helped Ukraine’s cyber defense as a volunteer. He added that in October 2023 when he was in Kyiv, he was asked to help launch cyberattacks against Russia, which made him suspect that this might be some kind of attempt to recruit him. According to him, he has not been involved in anything like this since then because he did not agree with the idea.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that after the video was published, Gundalf – that is, Dániel Hrabóczki – gave an interview to 444, showing his face and using his real name, and claimed that he had purposely misled the secret service agents during his hearing with AH. He justified all this by claiming that he had received messages from an unknown person named Theo, who claimed that the AH was interfering in the proceedings against them. According to Hrabóczki, Theo also told them that “the Constitution Protection Office itself is involved in the whole case, including in organising it”. This aligns with what Bence Szabó told Direkt36. According to Hrabóczki, he deliberately set out to construct a narrative during the interrogation because he believed they would fabricate charges against him for political reasons anyway. While Bence Szabó’s statement is coherent and logical, the same cannot be said of Gundalf’s interview with 444.

The mere fact that Hrabóczki went public and gave an interview does not mean that he was telling the truth. It is also noteworthy that, unlike Bence Szabó – who suspected a serious abuse of power behind the case and chose to go public with it despite the severe consequences for him – Hrabóczki, by his own admission, did not even want the whole matter to become public; he was not motivated by such concerns. And while he himself admits that he deliberately lied to the authorities, he did comply with the confidentiality obligations imposed on him. He only went public after the government released the recording that Hrabóczki believed would remain confidential.

It certainly reveals that the secret service was indeed involved in the case launched under the pretext of child pornography, as one of the targeted individuals, 19-year-old Hrabóczki, was definitely questioned/interrogated by AH staff. The recording also proves that after his home was searched under a false pretext in 2025, AH interrogators confronted Hrabóczki, asking him why he hadn’t reported to the Hungarian secret service that V. E. had approached him. (Henry is not mentioned in the recording.)

Additionally, one of the interrogators suggested to him that it was possible that preventing the Tisza Party from coming to power might not only be in the interest of the ruling party but of a foreign state as well. He then asked the IT specialist whether they had tried to find out who this “V. E.” might be who had approached them.

For most of the interrogation, the IT specialist is questioned about his activities abroad, so after the recording's publication, it might seem as though the mysterious figures attacking the Tisza Party (such as V. E. and Henry) and those with whom the IT specialist had come into contact well before the formation of Péter Magyar's party are one and the same.

The AH interrogators based this on the fact that V. E. phrased the chat messages in a very un-Hungarian way. Just as Bence Szabó merely inferred that there might be a unit within the Hungarian secret service working against the Tisza Party, so too did this interrogator merely infer this. There is no evidence that V. E. does not speak Hungarian, nor is there evidence to the contrary. Nothing is known about who V. E. or Henry is, so all information related to them is mere speculation.

The letter of the director general of the AH, which has been made public, states that “investigating the background of this person or these persons is also part of the counterintelligence investigation.” This confirms that the AH claims that they do not know who these individuals are either.

One peculiarity of the case is that, based on the information available so far, nothing can be ruled out; the possibilities are virtually endless, and Hrabóczki’s statement to the press does nothing to clarify the situation.

In addition to various intelligence agencies, Hrabóczki may have been approached by a group of private intelligence operatives, or even criminals. Intelligence services of other countries may also have tried to recruit him, if it is in their interest to keep the Fidesz government in power. Hence, there may have even been Russian or Israeli services behind these mysterious foreigners, and the list could go on.

In fact, one cannot even rule out the possibility that the alleged intent to undermine the Tisza Party was merely a cover story designed to get someone to approach Hrabóczki. After all, they knew he had been expelled from the Tisza Party and might therefore harbor resentment toward the party. There are countless potential scenarios.

This is an important question. The secret service must protect the constitution and the nation. Just as the police do not provide protection only to members of Fidesz or those supporting the ruling party, the AH must also protect all Hungarian citizens, regardless of their political affiliation. In the recorded conversation between Hrabóczki and the AH, one of the interrogators even stated that whoever spies on the Tisza Party is spying on Hungary, because the Tisza Party is part of Hungary. Which is why it would be extremely serious and unprecedented if it turned out that the secret service had spied on a political party.

This hearing was not like a police interrogation. It is regulated by the National Security Act, and a lawyer is not required to be present; moreover, it is voluntary: if someone does not want to speak with the AH, they cannot be compelled to do so. When a conversation such as this one takes place, the person being interviewed signs a confidentiality agreement, which means that everything said during such a conversation is classified as a state secret. This is why Hrabóczki told 444 that he didn’t understand why the recording of his interview was released, considering that the secret service agents had promised him it would remain confidential.

Because the custodian of the secret (the AH) declassified this recording.

In cases like this, the legal department of the intelligence service typically prepares a justification citing various laws to legally support why the release of the recording (or any classified information) is justified or permissible. They likely went through this process before making their decision. Although there has been no precedent for a video of an operative interrogation being released to the public with audio and video since the regime change, this is only the legal aspect of the story.

In the world of intelligence services, there is a strong aversion to allowing classified information of any kind to be disclosed in this manner. This is because rival intelligence agencies could extract information that might be of interest to them. Furthermore, such disclosures could lead people willing to speak to the AH to think twice – or even a thousand times – before deciding to speak up in the future. After all, they have good reason to believe that what they share with the agency in confidence could later be made public, leaving them to have to explain themselves.

This is clearly also what got to Hrabóczki, which is why he began offering explanations afterwards. So, publishing something like this will certainly make the future work of AH staff more difficult. It’s unlikely that the secret service were particularly pleased when the decision about releasing the video was made. To use an analogy, although Hrabóczki was not an informant for the AH, he believed he could speak to them in confidence. The situation is therefore similar to a journalist exposing their informant in a controversial matter solely for their own protection.

While we don't know whether this decision to publish the video was made at the intelligence or political level, it is likely that the move was primarily politically motivated. The government chose to respond to the allegations in this way to demonstrate that Hrabóczki’s past isn’t spotless either, and that there was good reason for both him and Buddha to come under the scrutiny of the security services. Furthermore, the video could be incorporated into the government’s narrative; it could be used to play the Ukrainian card. It has happened before that classified information was declassified for purely political purposes, such as when, years ago, conversations between the former spy chief Sándor Laborcz and Tamás Portik were made public.

Nevertheless, since this is how things turned out, the operation has been compromised either way. In a properly functioning country, the priority now should be to protect the interests of the national security services, not those of the ruling party. This means that if there really is no foul play in the matter and everything is above board, then the government’s selective disclosure of information is more damaging to the services – and thus to the country – than providing the public with reassuring answers to the questions that have arisen, regardless of the fact that we are in the middle of an election campaign. Because let’s not forget: whichever party ends up leading the government in the next term will still need the work of the national security agencies.

What appears certain is that the anonymous tip about child pornography was merely a pretext, a cover story, in order to justify the search. Since the AH was the one urging the search, it is also certain that the search itself and the seizure of the data storage devices were important to the secret service. It is also certain that Hrabóczki was just leading V. E. and Henry on, and he did not actually want to join their service. It is also certain that the Hungarian secret service was keeping an eye on the two IT specialists.

If we accept the statement made in the letter of the Director General of the AH – namely, that “mapping the background” of unknown actors in the case is still ongoing – then this mapping is now hindered by the fact that the operation has been compromised. But we must not overlook Bence Szabó’s logical conclusion either. In other words, Henry or V. E. could very well be a figure acting in the interest of the ruling party and must be sought within the AH. Until comprehensive investigations are conducted, neither version can be ruled out.

There are many questions we don't have answers to. Who are Henry and V. E.? At what level did the leadership of the AH and the NNI coordinate, and what were these discussions about? Is it true, as Bence Szabó claims, that the AH or senior police leadership exerted pressure to prevent the police from investigating Henry? But perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects is the timing: why did the raid and the seizure of data storage devices have to happen precisely when, according to the chat messages that were obtained later, the two IT specialists were planning to expose the mysterious Henry and his team by using a belt with a built-in hidden camera? Was this just a coincidence, or was there something else behind the timing? And if a counterintelligence operation was underway against the IT specialists, why was it interrupted by the search? Another question is whether there were other devices besides the belt with the hidden camera they wanted to obtain, and if so, for what purpose.

This may be significant because, according to the AH, the two IT specialists contacted representatives of a well-known company that manufactures and distributes spyware with a view to acquiring the software. If this is indeed the case, it is relevant because they could not have done so legally. This raises the question of how they were able to contact a company that produces such software in the first place. Hrabóczki denied this to 444, but in the same interview, he also indicated that – although not during his hearing, but he spoke about the supposed plans for acquiring the spyware and his connection to the Estonian intelligence service. The truth on this matter could probably be found in the classified materials of the case, but that information is not public. So for now, everyone has to decide for themselves what they think based on their own beliefs and either believe one side or the other. And, of course, another unanswered question is what other information the AH might have on the two IT specialists that would justify them being the targets of a counterintelligence investigation.

This story and all the details we know so far certainly highlight the fact that Hungarians have less and less trust in government agencies. And not without reason, as it is evident that some cases are being shelved by the prosecutor’s office and the police, just as it is clear that the (partial) results of certain investigations are being used for political purposes. It is also clear that while certain cases are prosecuted, and the authorities take a more active role, there are other cases where this does not happen. This phenomenon cannot be overlooked.

This is an extremely serious problem because it could lead to a loss of trust that would be very difficult to rebuild, if possible at all. And it is not about ordinary people not trusting the state; after all, let us not forget that this story was broken by an investigator in the National Bureau of Investigation. Additionally, Hrabóczki claims that when V. E. approached them, they wanted to find out who he might be, because they did not rule out the possibility that it was the Hungarian secret service spying on the Tisza Party. And this is precisely the crux of the matter: did a state agency spy on the party, or did it assist an outside actor in spying on or harming the party?

Another reason why the question is relevant is because a similar story unfolded years ago, when the Israeli private intelligence firm Black Cube carried out a covert operation against Hungarian citizens. Black Cube’s operation aimed to discredit its targets, which coincided with Fidesz’s propaganda interests. In that operation, the AH did not support Black Cube in any way; in fact, it found itself facing off against the Israelis. Nevertheless, the story had no consequences. For example, it never came to light whether anyone from the government, Fidesz, or Fidesz’s inner circle was in contact with Black Cube; the entire story was smoothed over. Only one thing was revealed: the material collected by Black Cube ended up with Viktor Orbán’s friend and comrade-in-arms, the government pundit Zsolt Bayer, who made use of it.

If the government were to decide to make as much information as possible public – and not only that which supports its own political narrative – then independent experts familiar with the intelligence sector would be able to determine whether everything that happened was lawful and professionally justified. That is precisely why the ball continues to bounce in the government’s court. Providing clarity would not only be in the public interest, but also in the interest of the national security services.